

México, corrupción organizacional institucionalizada: un estudio de caso

Mexico, institutionalized organizational corruption: a case study

Pablo Guerrero Sánchez

Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, México

pablodbk@gmail.com

Luis Pérez Álvarez

Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos, México

lpalvarez@uaem.mx

Resumen

El presente trabajo expone las razones que desde la perspectiva organizacional explican por qué en México no se han logrado implementar mecanismos de desarrollo en los principales temas sociales, económicos, políticos, educativos, científicos, de justicia, de gobierno y de salud, a nivel federal, estatal y municipal. Debido a distintos intereses (Banfield, 1975) y a la corrupción —que “existe en los tres niveles, [siendo] la más grave la federal... mientras que la de la policía es percibida como la más común, seguida de la de los diputados, y en menor grado la de las organizaciones privadas” (Morris, 2003, p. 678)—, existe una relación entre los compromisos, los actores y el gobierno, a partir tanto de la formación de cierta cultura (Xiaoajing, 2010) como de valores que se da entre sujetos que cultivan el hábito de la corrupción dentro de las organizaciones. Esto ha ocasionado que las instituciones en México sean débiles y que no se puedan establecer los mecanismos adecuados para la fundamentación de organizaciones e instituciones formales que regulen los temas sustantivos del país.

Palabras clave: corrupción organizacional, contexto y cultura.

Abstract

This paper exposes the reasons that explain why from the organizational perspective, Mexico have failed to implement mechanisms of development for the main matters social, economic, political, educational, scientific, of Justice, of Government and of health, at the federal, State and municipal levels. Due to different interests (Banfield, 1975) and to the corruption—that "exists in the three levels, [being] the more serious the federal... while the police is perceived as the most common, followed by the deputies, and to a lesser degree of private organizations" (Morris, 2003, p. 678)—, There is a relationship between commitments, stakeholders and Government, from both the training of a certain culture (Xioajing, 2010) as well as values that occurs between individuals who cultivate the habit of corruption within organizations. This has caused that institutions in Mexico are weak and that no suitable mechanisms can be set for the foundation of organizations and formal institutions that regulate the substantive themes of the country.

Key words: organizational corruption, context and culture.

Fecha Recepción: Marzo 2015

Fecha Aceptación: Septiembre 2015

Introduction

Definition

Corruption can be classified into levels macro, average and individual. In the level or organizational level, the basic concept of corruption involves two agents (x and y), being one of them the one that violates the ethical rule according to the wishes of the other (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 70); in addition, there is *influence*, resources and abuse of responsibilities collective to *private interests* (Husted, 1994, p. 18), as well as a *behavior* located within a *culture* organizational collective or individual, which can produce *simulation* (Chatman & Barsade, 1995). This is opposed to "good economic development of which depends on a good government controlling corruption, that is

politically stable, which applies the law, which has institutional quality, property, contractual rights and civil liberties" (Muhammad, 2014, p. 63), "reducing investment and economic growth" (Getz & Volkema, 2001, p. 8). In these circumstances, the federal, State and municipal government, in public and private organizations, is pierced by corruption.

Corruption as a problem of Government macro and meso level

Governance, public accountability and the effectiveness of the action of Government affect in different contexts (Muhammad, 2014, p. 65). This diverts the attention "of the failure of structural adjustment policies" (Harrison, 2007, pág. 675), and makes that level between *governance* involves contradictory political speeches on sovereignty and democracy, leaving the dishonesty under cover of a grey area (Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014, p. 235); hence the contradiction between the moral and the success (Derrida, 2005). Understanding corruption is to understand the human will as to the structure of action between "determinism and freedom"; however, it is very difficult to identify the causal links of corruption when they are studied as an Act and not as a process (Graaf, 2007, p. 40).

Causes, reasons and sources

Corruption can be analyzed from macro structures, social psychology and the theory of groups, or from the theory of social action. However, the Caiden theory (2001, q.v. 21-26) shows causes or factors psychological, ideological, external, economic, political, socio-cultural and technological that "the degree of corruption varies widely among individuals, government agencies, administrative cultures and geographic regions". This is visible in the differences between income and working conditions (Fijnaut, 2002) or "measures of intervention from the Government (or Government and its regulations), the wages of the public sector, procurement systems and promotion and the size of the bureaucracy, and in the case of companies, the location of monopoly" (Ahmad, 2004, p. 62). The monopoly has a price, since the money does not go to the Government or organization but to an agent (or person) (Banfield, 1975, p. 596). Here, the corruption "is equal to monopoly plus the discretion minus accounting" (Klitgard, 2006, p. 4). There exists no free competition and

the judicial system is not developed or is not independent enough (Ahmad, 2004, p. 67) due to the lack of "freedom of the press, the inequitable distribution of income and level, bureaucratic competition, urbanization and the level of education and information" (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 68, 72); Thus, countries with weak institutions are more corrupt than those countries with strong institutions (Morris, 2003, p. 672).

To Buscaglia (2014), weak states generate power vacuums. Consequently, the causes, reasons and sources of corruption in more than 109 countries around the world where he has studied and documented the phenomenon, are associated with the lack of judicial, economic controls, corruption itself, lack of citizen participation and limited international participation of governments to really combat this scourge. On judicial controls it notes that while prosecutors and prosecutors are still appointed by the presidents of the republic and the governors, these together with the (federal and state) police forces will only serve to those who appointed them, being a mere pantomime the administration and enforcement of justice.

National culture and social values that affect meso-level corruption

Colonialism and religion have also impacted this phenomenon (Ahmad, 2004, 70 p.); for example, there is less corruption and more corruption Protestantism in Catholic and Muslim cultures (Connelly & Ones, 2008, p. 366). Therefore be analyzed biblical beliefs about justice and the merely economic objective of the current social values (Banfield, 1975, p. 593).

These values impact "behavior of public officials ... for private purposes" (Huntington, 1989, p. 377), for whom "what is organizationally corrupt in an organizational, ethical and cultural context may not be in another ... making the results are historically or geographically specific "(Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 71). "In any society, corruption is a changing phenomenon, some of its aspects, such as morality, culture and conceptualization, are affected by personal interests, cultural values and socioeconomic status of the corrupt" (Brown, 2004, p. 2 Harrison, 2007, p. 673). Lose strength values to the context and meaning to be granted, that is, to the perception we have of them.

In such contexts antivalores as corruption, which has been created by habit that builds subjectivity in the collective unconscious and the same perception of the act they are formed. For example, it is perceived differently corruption of a citizen of a president or a businessman; and judged more severely "judges that police officers; bribery and extortion conflict of interest, or more harshly to the contribution of the campaign patronage; and harmful attitude to the petty attitude "(Malec, 1993, p. 16). Such behavior can be described as negative because of selfish interest arises only benefit himself (Linstead, Maréchal, & Griffin, 2014, p. 169).

The conflict of interest involves a personal economic and psychological gain (Macrina, in Aluja and Birke, 2004, p. 113) (Deepak & Gino, 2011, p. 563). For its part, the capitalist organization represents the true dishonesty, because the personal shortcomings do not explain corporate misconduct, but the tacit or implicit cooperation of other (Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014, p. 236), becoming interpersonal and relational dynamic system where individuals act to survive and adapt to the system.

Perspectives, theories and approaches

There are a variety of poses and explanations of the phenomenon of corruption in organizations.

The public choice bounded rationality studies, while theories explain corruption rotten apple from a bad character. The theory of organizational culture explains cultural patterns that produce a state of mind. The theories of social values in shock, where the causes are the values and norms of society that influence individuals, reduce situational aspects to individual moral conflicts. In theory ethos of public administration there is a cause between social pressure on levels of organizations and officials. Finally we have the correlation theories without a causal model where situational elements are studied (Graaf, 2007, p. 46).

An actor can corrupt the perspective of rational action, which focuses on environmental and situational incentives to commit the crime, (Bertrand, Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014, 884 pp.); however, "people usually act from an ethical impulse in prototypical situations"

(Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014, p. 237), measuring the cost-benefit, and the probability of punishment. In the case we treat the consequences of acts of corruption of power are measured agent; if this is a political leader or an officer is perceived as someone free to behave that way. In Latin America there are countless examples of this type, which flow into a cultural, economic and political problem that gives structure to define action and perception. Corruption and impunity are major problems in Latin America and the belief that you can not do anything about it (Lopez & Hemby, 2002).

Under these conditions, "characterized by low economic development, strong traditional enclaves, lack of equity in income and hierarchical social systems of social role, governments are typically more corrupt" (Ficher, Ferreira, Milfont, & Pilati, 2014, p. 1594), making the perception of powerlessness produce lack of participation, greater corruption and personalities (Morris, 2003, p. 674) are generated.

Corruption as disease or deviation

Some people become corrupt due to external factors or your psychopathic personality, generating costs in the organizational relationship (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 74), as well as governance problems (Husted, 1994, p. 21). Some can "respect the law because they consider it beneficial, while others do so because they fear the authority" (Morris, 2003, p. 684). Although in terms of law, "knowledge [can be] the awareness of the consequences generated by the break, and thus increase the moral support" (Godson, 2002, p. 440), this knowledge can also generate corruption in police forces and lawyers, as knowledge and personality structures are linked with cognitive, emotional and social levels.

In an organizational personality (Moufahim, Reedy, & Humphreys, 2015) "emotions, social responses and processes of identification and rabies, which can induce action" (Zietsma & Toubiana, 2015) are generated. From the perspective of the bad apples, this is internal and moral (Segal & Lehrer, 2012). When the social psychological factor status is added: the pursuit of prestige, pleasure needs, or reaction formation against social frustration, agents rationalize and legitimize their actions, and their psychopathic deviation project the blame on customers, users or citizens, forming in this social relationship a kind of personality and subjectivity.

From criminology, personality explains "seeing the offender to a relatively free person of intimate attachments, aspirations and moral beliefs that hold the majority" (Hirschi, 1969); their aspirations may lead to opportunism (Malhotra & Gino, 2011, p. 559), within a context of monetary incentives and options outside of the norm (Malhotra & Gino, 2011, p. 578). In group dynamics of an organizational culture where everyone is corrupt, individuals have to survive the structure and demands of the organization being too corrupt; sometimes, the poor performance of the organization leads them to commit corrupt acts or to align with illegal organizations (Bertrand, Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014, p. 885). Here is the organization that corrupts the individuals, but under what conditions individuals can corrupt the organization?

Does the person corrupts the organization or the organization corrupts the person?

Corruption is contagious when the organization or country are corrupt, that any way to live in such an environment can become corrupt because quitting means betraying the group (Graaf, 2007, p. 52); people become infected, starts, continues or succumb to corruption through coercion, remission or fulfillment of certain practices (Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). "An organizational environment can corrupt" (Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014, p. 237). Here not decay involves breaking the psychological contract where the organization provides resources of money, power, status and security in exchange for loyalty, and where badmouth the organization or corrupt members becomes taboo. "The functional work environments can lead to corruption when overlooked the expectations of employees, who think they are not getting what they deserve" (Kingshott & Dincer, 2004, p. 69). "Money and power are associated with psychological benefits and can change the behavior of people" (Deepak & Gino, 2011, p. 559). The distance is about power has been the strongest predictor culture of corruption (Connelly & Ones, 2008, p. 355), since it determines the relationships between actors within the system.

The system as interconnection relationships and interdependencies can therefore determine individual behavior; tempts with pecuniary gain and discourages compliance with the rules. When levels of morality and trust decrease becomes more difficult to resist corrupt practices (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 61).

Corruption can arise from the family where values or negative values are learned, or from secondary organizations such as schools, hospitals, government offices and businesses; also arises from conflicting social values, for example, illegally protecting family and friends, denying any right to enemies, or applying the law only to strangers (Graaf, 2007, p. 54). Shared contracts occur more often among family and friends because these relationships reduce risk and transaction costs (Husted, 1994, p. 22); although capitalism is dependent risk (Wexler, 2010), the law becomes a source of discretionary power undermines its legitimacy. Does the behavior is always opportunistic, or could be altruistic? (Segal & Lehrer, 2012, p. 170). In the case of organizations, managers, supervisors and operational, your personality type is different and their relationship and power distance can make a difference? Or in the case of the management of public organizations it is different from the companies, even when both within the organizational context or under different exercises power?

The new public management focused on indicators leads to more corruption (Graaf, 2007, p. 57) because of its economist approach that does not address ethical issues (Gregory, 1999). By taking elements of the private organization should "take risks to maximize profits" (Land, Loren, & Metelmann, 2014, p. 241). "In Mexico is increasingly complex relationship between corrupt politicians and servers, organizational problems, the public sector, business and organized crime" (Graaf, 2007, p. 61).

Some criminologists have suggested the use of network analysis, ie, a structure that organizes self from behavior that are acquiring the component parts. Unlike formal and hierarchical companies, two evils afflicting the institutions of security and justice are his weakness and proclivity, almost home, corruption. Both evils have reached extreme levels at the state and municipal levels (Castellanos, 2013, pp. 15, 42).

Consequently, there are "traffickers and Mexican politicians linked together; complicity between authorities and agencies with conflicting interests "(Castellanos, 2013, pp. 68, 69). Corruption expressed in terms of "bribery, nepotism, cheating, extortion ... it reflects the relationship between people and bureaucracies, but when it comes to the development of

public policies, nuances tend to disappear" (Harrison, 2007, p. 673) . In Latin America, politics and the relationship with power determine the actions.

In some countries the distance with power tends to reward loyalty more than merit, making it difficult for subordinates retain practices his superiors (Connelly & Ones, 2008, p. 355). There are psychological effects depending on the type of motivation on the action; "Wages are not the only reason, but also the wide range of benefits they are seeking. It should be understood the failure of the employer promises inherent in the contract [psychological]" (Kingshott & Dincer, 2004, p. 82).

Organizations in Mexico act according to their relationships and power distance, weakening the formal and institutional structures, even in cases where the law should be promoted as in police organizations.

The weakening of corporations, organizations and police institutions

When a key police informer Morelos met with the director of a primary school where they had surprised a child with drugs, he urged: "Do not say anything, because if you do not kill the child, kill you (the director school) and kill me. " This statement indicates infiltration, fear and power that has corrupted actors in other organizations and institutions: agents, police, judges, making has no control mechanisms between the narco and authority (Castellanos, 2013, p . 77).

Thus, "there is a negative relationship between the quality of institutions of a country and the likelihood of participation in a criminal cartel" (Bertrand, Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014, 889 pp.); here the cops usually show greed, tenacity and caution (Gonzalez & Perez Floriano, 2015, p. 1), playing the first and the desire for more of something (Wang & Murnighan, 2011). These desires are mobilized by "most influential groups identified corruption, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, multinational corporations, domestic businesses and unions (EDGE 2001)" (Morris, 2003, p. 680). Police are exposed to commit crimes and to become corrupt because of their low wages, as well as being physically violated due to the low quality of its equipment (LaRose & Maddan, 2009) (Sabet, 2012) (Uldriks, 2010); Mexican police faces a high degree of danger and abetting in relation to organized crime (Daly, Heinle, & Shirk, 2012), as well as a chaotic organizational culture, characterized by solidarity with criminals, secrecy, mutual dependence, a hierarchical

structure strict management and unfair competitive climate (Costas & Grey, 2014). Thus, corruption in police organizations cynicism goes through processes, rationalization and projection of blame. In Mexico it is common for police organizations tend to behave like criminals in a kind of isomorphism.

Criminal organizations can behave because the context is permitted (Bertrand, Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014, 881 pp.); in the case of legal organizations there is a need to design effective control strategies (Bertrand, Lumineau, & Fedorova, 2014, p. 900) through rules that would informal forms under regulatory controls (Kayes, 2006, p. 55), rules, supervision and sanctions for its violation.

The state and criminal organizations have been relating in new ways from violence and corruption, "a mechanism of coexistence that facilitates their development and impunity" (Castellanos, 2013, p. 85), something that happens in Mexico in a proportion of 96% (Morris, 2003, p. 692). After evaluating the cost benefit of the act of corruption and lack of interest by the government to combat it it concludes that action would go against their own interests. That seems to be the case for the legalization of marijuana in Mexico.

The rule of law and institutions in Mexico are becoming weaker, facilitating the economic power of the illegal organizations permeating the country at all levels, in a pact of coexistence "civilized" between the state and organized crime (Castellanos , 2013, p. 164).

The way has undermined the rule of law in the daily routine has helped create an organizational climate corrupt and a social imaginary on corruption.

Normalization of corruption in the social imaginary

The concept of habitus of Bourdieu and insight help to link social and mental structures that predispose people to corruption. The process and organizational habitus is internalized through leadership, conflict and change (Graaf, 2007, p. 74), when "corrupt behavior are accepted as bad normal behavior" (Gonzalez & Perez Floriano, 2015, p. 4) . "The presentation of certain cultural symbols can activate behaviors, beliefs and attitudes that increase the likelihood of acting with corruption" (Ficher, Ferreira, Milfont, & Pilati, 2014, p. 1595), although "behavior in business can not be consistent with the beliefs "(Husted,

1994, p. 17) and having an insidious behavior in the workplace, as hurt so subtle, repeatedly and directly to individuals and organizations of all kinds in the employment context (Linstead, Maréchal, & Griffin, 2014, p. 168).

There is also organizational corruption in the public and private sectors (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 60), whose motivations are psychological and perceptive about the situation (Davis, Shoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), in an irresponsible corporate social culture (Anand & Ashforth, 2005) (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008) (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995) (De Maria, 2009) (Doig, 2011) (Karhunen & Kosonen, 2013) (Rocha, Brown, & Cloke, 2011). Consequently, corruption is not only linked to the action of the bureaucracy but also to private action depending on the context, since the institutional regulatory framework in Mexico is weak and imperfect, whether in the field of health, education or any other. Knowledge gives power, which generates corruption; if science generates knowledge and this confers power, then science generates corruption (Valles Reyes Gomez & Romero, 2010, p. 3). Corrupt behavior and values are part of the culture and personality.

To fulfill organizational restrictions action outside the individual will is required that "many rules are validated by a third party" (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 63). "If the employee meets the standards within the organization, it means that the controls work; if they do not work, it means more controls" (Das & Teng, 1998) (Inkpen & Curral, 2004) are needed. This implies a relationship between the institution and psychology, where "the role of habit is important because it usually involves a sustained pattern" (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008, p. 66). "Habits are established by repeated behaviors" (Kilpinen, 2000) (Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002) (Hodgson & Jiang, 2008), becoming a legal, moral and ethical issue that is through practice values (Miller, 2005).

Controls on corruption must be made from above to reduce discretion and opportunism (Segal & Lehrer, 2012, p. 175) (Husted, 1994), this being the pursuit of self interest by cunning. You can achieve this opportunistic behavior by reducing self-control mechanisms (Lange, 2008, p. 720). External controls appear to be more effective, making decentralization can then influence a narcissistic level subjects to align their goals and interests with the collective and social welfare, for which it is necessary to interpret

regulatory frameworks (Segal & Lehrer, 2012, p. 181). Internal identities are changed by adopting values; "Can explain these changes in identity: self-expression, self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-evaluation, self-consistent theory of social identity, symbolic interaction and personal identification with the leader" (Segal & Lehrer, 2012, p. 183), changing through mechanisms of self-regulation, control and culture, peer and external regulation (Segal & Lehrer, 2012, p. 187). Thus, even in cases of governmental organizations and the presidency, the agency that regulates corruption should be external to the country to ortorgar that trust.

Morris (2003, p. 180) found from the ranking provided by the companies where there was more corruption in the federal police, PGR, IPAB, Customs, Pemex, Congress and the IMSS.

Methodology and field research

A series of interviews were conducted in various organizational settings, as well as field research and ethnographic observation governmental organizations, with the following results: with regard to handling within the organization in a population of individuals interviewed, they admitted they could find it reprehensible when it was exercised against them, whereas when it was committed against other members of the organization not conceptualized as morally negative. This usually occurs especially in cases where the family has built a system of values devoid of limits, reducing the ability of empathy and guilt, and increasing in all the cases analyzed little control impulses and low frustration tolerance, so the manipulation and lies were a concomitant. In any case, the corrupt personality as an internal factor was linked to external factors permissibility and low probability or risk of being caught.

Moreover, following qualitative methodological guidelines was able to interview some twenty employees of the PGR in Mexico, especially evaluators Confidence Control Center (Pérez, 2010). This center is where are held control assessments (medical-toxicological, psychological, social environment and financial position, monitoring) for the entry and stay of key personnel (judicial police, prosecutors, experts and middle managers). Respondents from different areas reported frequently evaluated admit behaviors of corruption, among

which are the "charolazo" in public transport services, try the white powder tongue to corroborate whether it is or not cocaine, promote and receive gifts to negotiate the release of detained criminals, taking drugs, stay with drug and other objects to make seizures, excessive use of force or even get to torture detainees, have links and dealings with crime groups organized, among others. These corrupt practices are supported in a chain of command that almost always scale up to the highest levels of the institution, though always publicly denied. This phenomenon is closely related to low salaries of key personnel who are driven to receive gifts or bribes "to complete the salary"; with antisocial personality traits, conflicts of power between groups, addictions, job stress, and so on.

In another of the edges of this same research, respondents reported that it is common for families and friends of the owners of the different areas of the PGR, do not go through the different filters trust control, but be directly recruited and placed in command posts, often without studies, preparation or relevant experience as appropriate and receiving the highest salaries. This contrasts with the salaries received by professionals who daily carry out an exhausting work in such environments. Also, many employees in middle management and senior are never evaluated these filters, except when they have become a burden for the institution and are looking for ways to dismiss them.

Conclusions

The phenomenon of corruption is multifactorial. In order to understand it is necessary to consider a wide range of causes, constraints and triggers in individual, group, organizational, institutional and social areas. It is a fact that there are no human groups in their DNA with the genetic load that predisposes them to it. Nor is it a purely cultural phenomenon, due to the simple fact that the societies studied and considered as the most corrupt not all its members are involved in corruption actions; Moreover, there are no companies which have not undergone minimally even if the phenomenon of corruption.

Corruption is a complex network of individual, family, group, organizational, institutional and social, where necessarily biological, psychological, historical, cultural, educational, economic, labor, moral and circumstantial interweave leading to an individual, group or organization to behave corruptly to the extent come to regard as a natural such conduct.

Bibliography

- Aluja, M. Y. (2004). Panorama general sobre los principios éticos aplicables a la investigación científica y la educación superior. En M. A. Birke, *El papel de la ética en la investigación científica y la educación superior*, pp. 87-143. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica/Academia Mexicana de Ciencias.
- Ahmad, N. (2004). Corruption and competition in bureaucracy: a cross-country analysis . *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, 61-86.
- Anand, V., & Ashforth, B. E. (2005). Business as usual: The acceptance and perpetuation of corruption in organizations. *Academy of Management Executive*, 19, 9-23.
- Ashforth, B. E., Gioia, D. A., Robinson, s. L., & Treviño, L. K. (2008). Re-viewing organizational corruption. *Academy of Management Review*, 33, 670-684.
- Banfield, E. C. (1975). Corruption as a feature of governmental organization. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 8 (3), 587-605.
- Bertrand, O., Lumineau , F., & Fedorova , F. (2014). The Supportive Factors of Firms' Collusive Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Cartels in the European Union. *Organization Studies*, 35 (6), 881-908.
- Buscaglia, E. (2014). *Vacíos de poder en México*. México: Debate.
- Caiden, G. (2001). *Corruption and Governance*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
- Castellanos, V. G. (2013). *historia del narcotráfico en México*. México: Aguilar.
- Chatman, J. A., & Barsade , S. G. (1995). Personality, Organizational Culture, and Cooperation: Evidence from a Business Simulation. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40 (3), 423-443.
- Connelly, B. S., & Ones, D. S. (november de 2008). The Personality of Corruption A National-Level Analysis . *Cross-Cultural Research*, 353-385 .
- Costas, J., & Grey, C. (2014). Bringing secrecy into the open: Towards a theorization of the social processes of organizational secrecy. *Organization Studies*, 23, 1423-1447.
- Daly, C., Heinle, K., & Shirk, D. A. (2012). *Armed with impunity: Curbing military human rights abuses in Mexico*. Special Report of the Trans-Border Institute.

- Daboub, A., Rasheed, A. M., Priem, R. L., & Gray, D. A. (1995). Top management team characteristics and corporate illegal activity. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 138-170.
- Das, T., & Teng, B. (1998). Between trust and control. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 491-512.
- Davis, J., Shoorman, D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Towards a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management Review*, 22, 20- 47.
- Deepak, M., & Gino, F. (2011). The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56 (4), 559-592.
- Derrida, J. (2005). *Rogues: Two essays on reason*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Doig, A. (2011). Numbers, words and KYC: Knowing your country and knowing your corruption. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 7, 142-158.
- Ficher, R., Ferreira, M. C., Milfont, T., & Pilati, R. (2014). Culture of Corruption? The Effects of Priming Corruption Images in a High Corruption Context. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 45 (10), 1594-1605 .
- Fijnaut, C. &. (2002). *Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement*. Den Haag: Kluwer Law International.
- Geoffrey Hodgson, S. J. (2008). La economía de la corrupción y la corrupción de la economía: una perspectiva institucionalista. *Revista de Economía Institucional*, 10 (18), 55-80.
- Getz, K. A., & Volkema, R. J. (March 2001). Culture, Perceived Corruption, and Economics A Model of Predictors and Outcomes. *Business & society*.
- Godson, D. J. (2002). Countering crime and corruption: A school-based program on the US-Mexico border. *Criminal justice*, 2 (4), 439-470.
- Gonzalez, J. A., & Pérez Floriano, L. R. (2015). If You Can't Take the Heat: Cultural Beliefs about Questionable Conduct, Stigma, Punishment, and Withdrawal among Mexican Police Officers. *Organization Studies*, 1- 23.
- Graaf, G. D. (2007). Causes of corruption: towards a contextual theory of corruption. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 31 (1), 39-86.

- Gregory, R. (1999). Social Capital Theory and Administrative Reform: Maintaining Ethical Probity. *Public Administration Review*, 59, 63-76.
- Harrison, E. (2007). Corruption. *Development in Practice*, 17 (4), 672-678.
- Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of Delinquency*. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.
- Huntington, S. (1989). Modernization and Corruption. *Political Corruption*, 377-388.
- Husted, B. W. (1994). Honor among thieves a transaction cost interpretation of corruption in third world countries. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 4 (1), 117- 27.
- Jaime, L., & Hemby, L. (septiembre 2002). Democracia y activismo anticorrupción. *Revista Probidad*.
- Klitgard, R. (march 2006). International cooperation agaist corruption. *Fianance and development*, 3-6.
- Karhunen, P., & Kosonen , R. (2013). Strategic responses of foreign subsidiaries to host country corruption: The case of Finnish firms in Russia. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 9, 88-105.
- Kayes, D. C. (2006). Organizational Corruption as Theodicy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 67 (1), 51-62.
- Kilpinen, E. (2000). *The enormous Fly.Wheel of society: Pragmatism's Habitual Conception of Action and Social Theory*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
- Kingshott, R. P., & Dincer , O. C. (2004). Determinants of Public Service Employee Corruption: A Conceptual Model from the Psychological Contract Perspective. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 50 (1), 69-85.
- Land, C., Loren, S., & Metelmann, J. (2014). Rogue Logics: Organization in grey Zone. *Organization Studies*, 35 (2), 233-253.
- Lange, D. (2008). A multidimensional conceptualization of organizational corruption control. *Academy of Management Review*, 33, 710-729.
- LaRose, A., & Maddan, S. A. (2009). Reforming la policía: Looking to the future of policing in Mexico. *Police Practice and Research*, 10, 333-348.
- Laura Verónica Reyes Gómez, J. A. (2010). El deber ser del investigador. *Cuadernos de Educación y Desarrollo*, 2 (19).
- Linstead, S., Maréchal, G., & Griffin, R. W. (2014). Theorizing and researching the dark side of organization. *Organization Studies*, 35, 165-188.

- Malec, K. (1993). Public Attitudes toward Corruption: Twenty-five Years of Research. *Ethics and Public Administration*, 13-27.
- Malhotra, D., & Gino, F. (2011). The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56 (4), 559-592 .
- Maria, W. D. (2009). Business, ethnography and the global economic crisis: Paradigm power in the African ‘corruption’ debate. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 5, 263-284.
- Miller, S. (2005). Corruption. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* .
- Morris, S. E. (2003). Corruption and Mexican Political Culture. *Journal of the Southwest*, 45 (4), 671-708.
- Moufahim, M., Reedy, P., & Humphreys , M. (2015). The Vlaams Belang: The Rhetoric of Organizational Identity. *Organization Studies*, 36 (1), 91-111.
- Muhammad, I. (2014). Aid allocation, selectivity, and the quality of governance . *Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science*, 19, 63-68.
- Navarro, E. M. (2010). *Ética profesional de los profesores*. Bilbao: Des- clé de Brouwer.
- Pinto, J., Leana, C. R., & Pil, F. K. (2008). Corrupt organizations or organizations of corrupt individuals? Two types of organization-level corruption . *Academy of Management Review*, 33, 685-709.
- Rocha, J. L., Brown, E., & Cloke, J. (2011). Of legitimate and illegitimate corruption: Bankruptcies in Nicaragua. *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, 7, 159-176.
- Sabet, D. (2012). *Police reform in Mexico: Informal politics and the challenge of institutional change*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Segal, L., & Lehrer, M. (2012). The Institutionalization of Stewardship: Theory, Propositions, and Insights from Change in the Edmonton Public Schools. *Organization Studies*, 33 (2), 169-201.
- Uldriks, N. (2010). *Mexico’s unrule of law: Implementing human rights in police and judicial reform under democratization*. Lanham, MA: Lexington Books.
- W., Wood, Quinn, J., & Kashy, D. (2002). Habits in Everyday Life: Thought, Emotion, and Action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83, 1281-1297.

- Wang, L., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). On greed. *Academy of Management Annals*, 5, 279-316.
- Wexler, M. N. (2010). Financial edgework and the persistence of rogue traders. *Business and Society Review*, 1 (25), 115.
- Xioajing, L. L.H. (2010). Cultural differences in online learning: international student perceptions. *Educational Technology & Society*, 13 (3), 177- 188.
- Zietsma, C., & Toubiana, M. (2015). Beyond the Gap: Discovering the impact and importance of studying Emotions & Institutions. *Organization Studies*.